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Abstract. Models of economic geography posit that the density of economic activity has
two e⁄ects that oppose each other in equilibrium: decreasing returns to productive activities
due to congestion e⁄ects and increasing returns that result from information spillovers and
local demand externalities. In an in￿ uential paper, Ciccone and Hall (1996) looked at the
e⁄ect of county level labor market concentration on per-worker Gross State Product in a cross
section of US States, and observed that on net, the increasing returns/agglomeration e⁄ect
dominates. We extend their analysis and re-examine the relationship between density and
productivity across industries and over both states and time. Through careful identi￿cation
of the source and nature of productivity shocks, we show that the evidence for agglomeration
e⁄ects is indeed quite robust, even within industries, providing evidence for the presence of
Marshallian externalities. As for the balance of agglomeration and congestion e⁄ects found
in previous literature, what we call ￿net increasing returns to scale", the evidence is much
weaker.
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￿We should be justi￿ably skeptical of any test of agglomeration that did not
control for geographic concentration due to the supply of exogenous site-speci￿c
resources.￿
Ellison and Glaeser (Journal of Political Economy, 1997)
1 Introduction
Theoretical models of economic geography posit that the geographic concentration of eco-
nomic activity has two e⁄ects that oppose each other in equilibrium: decreasing returns
to productive activities due to congestion e⁄ects and increasing returns that result from
information spillovers and local demand externalities.1 This paper explores how spatial
agglomeration of production at the local level in￿ uences aggregate labor productivity of the
region. The heterogeneity across US states, in terms of labor productivity and the density
of economic activity, allows us to test for the presence of increasing returns to scale that
may exists across US states and over time. Using the density of economic activity as our
measure of geographic concentration, we speci￿cally examine the existence and strength of
spatial agglomeration e⁄ects in production both at the aggregate and industry level. A com-
prehensive examination by industry using density, as opposed to size to measure geographic
concentration, to our knowledge has not been fully addressed.
The concept of external economies, ￿rst illustrated by Alfred Marshall (1920), has oc-
cupied a central role in urban economics, as it is closely allied with the observed spatial
concentration of production. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) provide a compre-
hensive dynamic general equilibrium framework that addresses the channels and forces of
agglomeration, pricing and factor market dynamics, and the stability of equilibria.
The vast majority of the evidence in literature supports the hypothesis of agglomeration
1Krugman (1991) presents the canonical theory of economic geography. For a comprehensive discussion,
see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).2
economies.2 Despite the evidence, empirical identi￿cation and quanti￿cation of the relevant
equilibrium forces are di¢ cult tasks. As such, we follow many previous studies that look at
density as the key determinant of productivity by relying on partial equilibrium analysis.3
In an in￿ uential paper, Ciccone and Hall (1996) model the externality from local pro-
duction as arising from the density, rather than the size of economic activity, and examine
the e⁄ect of county level labor market concentration on Gross State Product per worker in
a cross section of US States.4 They estimate, via non-linear instrumental variables, the
returns to scale of these local economies as the net e⁄ect of (neoclassical) congestion e⁄ects
on the one hand, and agglomeration e⁄ects on the other. Instrumental variables were used
to address possible reverse causality in the relationship between labor productivity and spa-
tial density and included historical data for size and density, as well as characteristics that
a⁄ected population in the past. They ￿nd evidence of net increasing returns to scale due to
spatial agglomeration. According to Ciccone and Hall, the doubling of average state density
increases average state labor productivity by about six percent.5
Our work builds on the original work of Ciccone and Hall and explores the robustness
of their ￿ndings. More speci￿cally, we use variation across both states and time to better
2In a survey of empirical studies, Rosenthal and Strange (2004) ￿nd that most studies ￿nd that doubling
city size is associated in a 3-8% increase in labor productivity.
3Under a partial equilibrium framework, we allow for the possibility that net local economies of scale
can exist in equilibrium. The focus of our analysis is on estimating the scale of local economies, while
putting aside the question of local factor prices. Clearly, in order for net local economies of scale to exist
in equilibrium, there must be other factors, such as higher prices of housing or other local amenities, that
drive a wedge between the production and consumption wage, hence eliminating the incentive for workers
and ￿rms to relocate.
4Ciccone and Hall (1996) use county level employment relative to physical space (acres) to capture
the degree of agglomeration within a state. They argue that density, rather than size, is a more accurate
measure of the extent of agglomeration and spatial externalities. They also choose to look at density relative
to physical space because it is less subject to the (perhaps) arbitrary classi￿cation of ￿city boundaries.￿
Other studies on the size of industries, such as Henderson (1986), do not focus speci￿cally on the localization
of the external economies.
5Later studies have con￿rmed the existence of agglomeration e⁄ects. For example, Ciccone (2002) ￿nd ag-
glomeration e⁄ects in Europe that are slightly smaller than analogous e⁄ects in the United States. Combes
et al. (2010) also added geological variables as instruments, and con￿rm the existence of agglomeration
economies in French data. Ke (2009) use a simultaneous equation model and ￿nd that the spatial concen-
tration of industrial production is an important cause of higher productivity across Chinese cities.3
control for state ￿xed e⁄ects and state-level business cycle ￿ uctuations in attempt to isolate
exogenous movements in density.6 In addition, we explore the extent to which di⁄erences in
industrial composition across states may play in explaining the observed correlation between
production density and labor productivity.
The thought experiment that implicitly must stand behind any econometric identi￿cation
of the e⁄ects of labor density on productivity is that density is assigned exogenously to US
counties. Clearly the identi￿cation issue looms large. Is New York City productive because
it is densely populated or is it densely populated because economic activities are especially
productive there? Our test of the robustness of the Ciccone and Hall ￿nding seeks to address
a number of identi￿cation issues that are of potential concern.
Firstly, we estimate the density-productivity relation at the industry level. To our
knowledge, a detailed comparison of agglomeration e⁄ects across industries has not been
address in the current literature. This analysis is motivated in part by Costello (1993),
who highlights the role industry speci￿c e⁄ects play in explaining aggregate productivity
￿ uctuations. We address the possibility that the positive net increasing returns to scale
found by Ciccone and Hall may be driven by particular industries within a state. Suppose
high productivity industries locate in dense states and low productivity industries locate
in low density states, then a possible interpretation for the ￿nding of increasing returns to
density based on cross state observations is that it merely re￿ ects the particular industry
mix within a state. In other words, states specializing in highly productive industries may,
by necessity, be dense, whereas low productivity states may be less spatially dense, and cross
6The ￿nding of increasing returns in local economies, where agglomeration e⁄ects form the channel for
the externality, has been con￿rmed by Harris and Ioannides (2000). They look at metropolitan statistical
area real wages and population density, as opposed to state level productivity and the density of employment.
Their data comes from the decennial census, which covers every 10th year from 1950 to 1990. Harris and
Ioannides do not attempt to control for secular trends over the 50 years of data that they use. And
their estimations are done via ordinary least squares, without controlling for the potential endogeneity of
density with respect to productivity/wages. Because our interest is to provide a more careful and detailed
examination of Ciccone and Hall (1996), we followed their state-level approach.4
state comparisons do not capture measures of local externalities.
Additionally, industry-level analysis may help distinguish between two potential sources
of economies of scale, namely the so-called Marshallian externalities, which arise from ￿rms
in the same industry locating near one another, and urbanization externalities, which are the
positive e⁄ects that arise from the general diversity and scale of urban areas. Studies which
investigate industry speci￿c e⁄ects have focused primarily on the manufacturing sector. For
example, Wheeler (2006) ￿nd that the increasing relationship between workers wages and
average plant size. Ellison et al. (2010) ￿nd that labor pooling, knowledge spillovers and
input-output linkages are all important in explaining conglomeration patterns among man-
ufacturing industries. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) also conclude that input-output linkages
are important for manufacturing ￿rms, but is more important for service ￿rms. Neverthe-
less, they note that agglomeration operating though knowledge spillovers and the transfer
of information are more important. Kolko (2000) argues that advances of information tech-
nology have diminished the importance of transaction costs in the location of ￿rms in the
service industry. Instead ￿rms tend to locate near workers that the industry demands.
Secondly, the results of Ciccone and Hall and our thought experiment above suggest that
were we to uproot a worker from the middle of Idaho to Manhattan, the worker￿ s productivity
would rise purely because New York city is denser. This story assumes that there are no New
York speci￿c e⁄ects that cause economic activity to be highly productive, which also has
encouraged people to locate there. As pointed out by Hanson (2000), Ellison and Glaeser
(1997), among others, regional amenities are likely to simultaneously a⁄ect labor productivity
(or wages) and the location decision of workers, i.e. density. To the extent that geographic
amenities are ￿xed in time and place, say for example New York Harbor, we employ panel
estimation with state ￿xed e⁄ects to control for this potential source of bias. Henderson
(2003) employ a similar approach by including city and time ￿xed e⁄ects to identify scale
externalities for the machinery and high tech industries. Although Ciccone and Hall attempt5
to control for the endogeneity of density by using a variety of instruments (all of which can
be loosely thought of as lagged density), if past density and current productivity are both
impacted by the same state ￿xed e⁄ect, then cross sectional estimates would still be biased.
In this case, panel estimation would be necessary and may in fact, be all that is needed.7
Thirdly, cyclical ￿ uctuations in technology may simultaneously a⁄ect both labor pro-
ductivity and employment density. As discussed in Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Foote
(2000), geographic labor ￿ ows are quite sensitive to business cycle conditions. If people move
to high productivity places in response to good technology outcomes and low unemployment
rates, we would be identifying the e⁄ect of density on productivity o⁄of endogenous cyclical
variation. In the panel estimation discussed above, such state cycles hamper identi￿cation.8
To address this, we use measures of local aggregate demand to control for state business cycle
e⁄ects.
Even after controlling for cyclical e⁄ects as well as state and time e⁄ects, there may still
be an endogeneity problem if workers relocate in respond to contemporaneous idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. We therefore attempt to isolate truly exogenous movements in density
using two alternative instruments. The ￿rst instrument we use is lagged density. Although
the direction of causality between current labor productivity and current employment den-
sity may be blurred, we argue that conditional on state, time, and business cycles, lagged
employment density is exogenous with respect to current labor productivity.
As a robustness check, we also use state di⁄erences in birthrates 20 and 25 years ago
to instrument for current density. In accordance with the stylized fact that birthrates
tend to be high in poorer regions and relative state income positions are quite persistent,
7Ciccone and Hall use four separate instruments for state density: distance to the Eastern seaboard,
existence of a railroad in 1860, population in 1850, and population density in 1880.
8The business cycle ￿ uctuations that we are addressing here are state-speci￿c. Any aggregate US-wide
shock can be controlled for in the panel using a time ￿xed e⁄ect. The most readily available state-level
cyclical control is state unemployment rates. But as detailed by Foote (2001), using the unemployment rate
in our context would not help us to sort out the causation issue.6
we recognize that this instrument may lead to a downward bias in our estimate of the
net increasing returns to scale. Although far from perfect, under certain assumptions about
workers behavior, these two instruments allow us to treat the resulting movements in density
as exogenous with respect to the state and time speci￿c productivity shocks, or at least,
provide us with an estimated range of the e⁄ect of density on average labor productivity.
Previewing our results below, through careful identi￿cation of the source and nature of
productivity shocks, we show that the evidence for agglomeration e⁄ects is quite robust,
even within industries. This suggests the presence of Marshallian externalities within many
industries. Moreover, industry speci￿c estimates point to the presence of spillover e⁄ects
across industries. As for the balance of agglomeration and congestion e⁄ects, what we call
￿net increasing returns to scale,￿the evidence is mixed.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework
underlying our analysis. Section 3 describes the data and illustrates some of the basic
empirical facts about state and county level economic activity. Section 4 presents the
empirical ￿ndings, and in section 5, we discuss our ￿ndings and conclude.
2 Theoretical Framework
Increasing returns from the density of production may arise from many sources, either exter-
nal or internal to the ￿rm. Marshall (1920) and Henderson (1974, 1988), for example, focus
on industry-speci￿c technology and knowledge spillovers between nearby ￿rms that induce
￿rms to agglomerate. Knowledge spillovers have been veri￿ed empirically by Henderson
(2003), Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Ja⁄e et al (1993) among others. Fujita (1988,
1989) and Krugman (1991) utilize the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition mar-
ket structure to demonstrate demand linkages as the source of increasing returns. When
trade is costly (for example iceberg type transportation costs), easier access to a greater7
variety of local intermediate inputs and services provide incentives for ￿rms to locate near
larger markets. Duranton and Puga (1999) and Lucas (1988) o⁄er examples of how localized
human-capital externalities may serve as forces of agglomeration. Acting against these local
externalities are congestion costs associated with limited local supplies of non-traded goods
and other negative amenities associated with spatial crowding. Other sources of increas-
ing returns that are highlighted in literature include input sharing (Burch￿eld et al., 2006;
Holmes, 1999), labor market pooling (Overman and Puga, 2010; Ellison et al., 2010), search
and matching process (Gan and Li, 2004; Costa and Kahn, 2000; Helsey and Strange, 1991)
and establishment scale (Wheeler, 2006).
Estimation of general equilibrium models of external economies, however, need to con-
front the possibility of multiple equilibria, as discussed in Hanson (2000). Instead, we follow
the partial equilibrium approach formulated by Ciccone and Hall, where geographically lo-
calized externalities in production at the county level are the source of aggregate increasing
returns. And congestion e⁄ects take the form of neoclassical decreasing returns to inputs.
The main di⁄erence between our model and the model of Ciccone and Hall is that we
speci￿cally incorporate time into the model and include a more detailed treatment of the
technology shocks across time and geography. The way in which we specify the technology
shock will provide the identi￿cation assumptions in our estimations, as will be seen below in
Section 4.
In our model, production is assumed to take place at the county level on each acre of
land. Let yt denote output on an acre of land. The inputs to production are labor per
acre, denoted nt, which is augmented by ht, the e¢ ciency of labor, and capital per acre,
which is denoted by kt. Let ￿st denote a Hicks neutral production technology that is the
same everywhere within a state s at time t. The agglomeration externality is modeled
by linking production in the county as a whole to per acre production for all acres in the
county. Speci￿cally, output per acre is in￿ uenced by production per acre in the county as8
a whole, represented by
yct
ac , where yct is county-wide output at time t, and ac denotes the












The labor and capital inputs are governed by the neoclassical decreasing returns to scale
parameters ￿￿ and ￿(1 ￿ ￿), where ￿ is smaller than one by the amount the share of land
occupies in total factor payments (typically about 5 to 6 percent). The output externality
from economic activity is a function of the density of economic activity at the overall county
level, with constant elasticity (￿￿1)=￿. The existence of localized production externalities
would imply ￿ > 1:
Assuming inputs are evenly distributed across all acres within a county, per acre variables




























￿ = ￿￿ (3)
￿ captures the competing e⁄ects of the decreasing marginal product of factors in ￿, which
can be thought of as a congestion e⁄ect, and the agglomeration e⁄ect of ￿. Values of
￿ ￿ 1 imply that the e⁄ects of agglomeration outweigh the e⁄ects of congestion, and on
net, higher density of economic activity leads to an increase in total factor productivity.
As a benchmark, we treat ￿ to be around 0:95, with land occupying about 5% of total
factor payments.9 Any estimate of ￿ greater than 0:95 would then imply some degree of
9Ho, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2002) show that land￿ s share of factor payment in the US economy is between9
agglomeration e⁄ects, i.e. ￿ > 1, and that the agglomeration e⁄ects outweigh the congestion
e⁄ects on net.
Assuming perfect capital mobility, the rental price of capital rt will be the same every-
where at each time t. Using the factor demand equation, we can substitute kct = ￿(1 ￿








where ct is a function of the interest rate at time t and invariant across state. The elasticity





and the elasticity of county employment density ￿ is
￿ =
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
: (6)
Because reliable measures of output are available only at the state level, we sum up county
output across all counties in a state (we use capital letters denote state level variables). We
further assume that labor quality hct is the same within all counties of a state and depends















Dividing through by total state employment and taking logs on both sides, state level output
5 and 6%.10















In other words, state level labor productivity is a function of employment density at the
county level.
The two key parameters are ￿, the returns to employment density, and ln(￿st); state level
technology. Similar to our discussion above, estimates of ￿ greater than 1 imply that there
are net increasing returns to scale as agglomeration e⁄ects outweigh congestion e⁄ects. And
as a benchmark, estimates of ￿ greater than about 0.92 imply that, even if on net neoclassical
congestion e⁄ects dominate, agglomeration e⁄ects are still important (￿ > 1).10
The way in which we specify ln(￿st) will help clarify our identi￿cation assumptions in
the empirical work below. For example, Ciccone and Hall assume that state technology
is log-normally distributed around a country-wide time invariant mean. So in their cross
section estimation, ln(￿st) reduces to   + "s. In our most general speci￿cation, we assume
that shocks to ln(￿st) to have a state speci￿c term, a time speci￿c term, a cyclical term, and
a term that is iid and can be thought of as a purely random, one-o⁄innovation to technology
that is uncorrelated across time or states.
3 The Data and Some Facts
3.1 The Data
The data used in this paper are annual from 1982 to 1999 for the District of Columbia and
all states except Alaska.11 Our measure of output at the state level is real Gross State
10Section 4.1 below explains how the 0:92 benchmark is derived.
11We maintain the exclusion of Alaska that was employed in the original Ciccone and Hall paper.11
Product (GSP) and comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We use both total real
GSP (1996 dollars) by states as well as real GSP by state by one-digit Standard Industrial
Classi￿cation (SIC) industry. The chained price that is used to de￿ ate GSP data is based
on the national price of goods produced in each industry.12 The aggregate state real GSP
and state real GSP by one-digit SIC industry are chain-weighted sums of the disaggregated
pieces. Real state GSP represents the composition of state production valued at common
national prices. Di⁄erences in real GSP across states re￿ ects di⁄erences in the production
bundle of the states evaluated at a common price. Cross-state di⁄erences in input and/or
output prices are not re￿ ected in these data.
Employment by one-digit SIC industry by county is available from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis Regional Economic Information System CD. We aggregate up the county
level employment to get state employment both in total and by industry. And we de￿ne
labor productivity as real state output divided by state employment.
Lagged employment density, which is used as a state level instrument in the estimation
of (8) is constructed as an index measure of the average county level employment density
within a state:











where s indexes US states, c indexes the counties of state s, Nst is employment in state s,
nct is employment in county c at time t, and ac is the number of acres in county c. This
index is a linearized version of the measure of local employment density in equation (8).13
12The BEA has price data for 63 industries. Real state GSP is generated by summing up (using chain-
weights) all 63 components of state output. For a more detailed discussion see the August 2001 Survey of
Current Business.
13In this paper all estimation is done via non-linear least squares as dictated by the functional form of
equation (8). In unreported results, we estimated alternative speci￿cations with ordinary least squares using
this linearized index in place of the last term in (8). The results are quite similar to those reported in this
paper. We also used the linear speci￿cation to check the explanatory power of all instrumental variables.
Instrument relevance was con￿rmed in all speci￿cations for lagged density, and the majority of speci￿cations
for birthrates.12
Human capital is measured as the hours-weighted average years of schooling for workers
in each state by industry and is based on data from the monthly Current Population Survey.
In 1992, the CPS switched from asking respondents about years of schooling to asking them
about educational attainment. Following Jaeger (1997), we map educational attainment
data from post-1992 CPS data to years of schooling by using an imputed highest grade
completed, which attempts to make the two parts of the series consistent.
3.2 Some Facts
Labor productivity is extremely heterogenous across states and across industries. In 1982,
real average productivity (output per worker in 1996 dollars) was about 41,000 dollars for the
US as a whole (see Table 1). By 1999, this ￿gured had grown about 25 percent to just over
51,000 dollars. However, this growth conceals a good deal of the underlying heterogeneity.
The standard deviation of state-level productivity was about 5,000 dollars in 1982 and had
grown to over 8,000 dollars in 1999. To better illustrate the cross state di⁄erences in
productivity, take for example New York and Montana. New York led the nation in labor
productivity in 1999, at over 70,000 dollars per worker. In contrast, an average Montana
worker produced only 36,000 dollars of output, nearly half the level of a New York worker,
and had the lowest productivity in the country. In 1982, New York ranked second in the
nation in labor productivity at just over 51,000 dollars per worker. Montana was ranked in
the middle of the country in 1982 with productivity of nearly 39,000 dollars per worker. In
other words, from 1982 to 1999, average (across states) productivity grew about 25 percent,
New York￿ s productivity grew over 36 percent, and productivity in Montana fell by about
seven percent.
Turning to density, the least dense state in 1999 was Wyoming with less than one worker
per hundred acres. Not surprisingly, the most dense state is New York with over 41 workers13
per acre. Density by industry varies quite a bit as well. Columns 4 and 7 of Table 1
present summary statistics for the density index constructed using expression (9) by industry.
Because the index weighs a county￿ s employment density by the population density, counties
with a sparse population contribute less to the state level index than a densely populated
county would. For example, the mean employment density index of 37.27 for the ￿nance,
insurance and real estate sector in 1982 re￿ ect the fact that the high employment density in
New York City is weighted more heavily than the low employment density in rural Wyoming.
Total density has grown over time from 192.39 workers per acre in 1982 to 207.34 workers
per acre in 1999. Average density is greatest in the services sector with 62.48 workers per
acre in 1982, followed by government with 42.16 workers per acre. In contrast, agriculture
has, on average, 0.75 workers per acre.
With regard to the composition of state output in Table 2, we focus on manufacturing
and services. Clearly, these two industries have experienced vastly di⁄erent fortunes. Man-
ufacturing has declined in importance, with its share of employment and output falling over
time. However, the labor decline has outpaced the decline in its share of output, so manu-
facturing￿ s productivity has increased by over 66 percent. Not only has the average level of
productivity increased, the standard deviation has more than doubled as well. In contrast
to manufacturing, services has seen modest gains in employment share, output share, and
labor productivity.
4 Identi￿cation, Estimation and Results
Spatial increasing returns are di¢ cult to observe or quantify empirically, providing re-
searchers little choice but to make inference indirectly. As summarized in Hanson (2000),
empirical identi￿cation of agglomeration economies is a task wrought with di¢ culties, with
three key complications that are particularly di¢ cult to resolve: unobserved regional char-14
acteristics, simultaneity in regional data, and multiple sources of externalities. Although we
are far from claiming our approach has resolved these di¢ culties, the estimation procedure
we discuss below allows us to more systematically evaluate the relevance of each.















we will make explicit assumptions about ln(￿st), which will give us guidance as how best to
estimate ￿:
4.1 Controlling for Industry Composition
We ￿rst follow the assumptions made by Ciccone and Hall that at each time t, ln(￿st) is
log-normally distributed around a nationwide mean. It can then be expressed as   + "st
where "st is uncorrelated across states. Therefore, ￿ can be estimated using cross state














+ ￿ lneds + "s: (10)
which we estimate using data from 1999 via non-linear least squares.14
Again, values of b ￿ > 1 (where the hat denotes the estimate of ￿) indicate that on net,
the e⁄ect of agglomeration dominates the e⁄ect of congestion, or that the externalities of
production density outweigh the neoclassical decreasing marginal product of factors.
The ￿rst panel of Table 3 presents the results both for total state output per worker
as well as output per worker by one-digit SIC industries. For total GSP, the estimated
￿ is 1:08 and is signi￿cantly greater than 1. This implies that a doubling of employment
14We performed the same estimations for other years as well but do not report them here. The results
are qualitatively similar to the ones for 1999.15
density increases average state labor productivity by 8 percent. Log education does not
enter signi￿cantly in this base line speci￿cation. Our initial estimates are in line with the
results of Ciccone and Hall.
To understand the implications of ￿ = 1:08; we use the following benchmark factor
payment decomposition: 5% land (￿ = 0:95), 60% labor (￿￿), and 35% capital (￿(1 ￿ ￿)).
From equations (5) and (6) above, ￿ = 1:08 implies that ￿ is around 1:05.15 That is, doubling
the production density in a county results in a 5% increase in total factor productivity. The
implied agglomeration parameter ￿ is roughly 1:10, suggesting that the elasticity of output
with respect to density is roughly 9%. In fact, in our benchmark economy, any b ￿ larger
than 0:92 would imply some degree of production economies of scale (￿ > 1) even if on net,
agglomeration is dominated by congestion.
Motivated by our summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2 which suggest that output per
worker looks very di⁄erent by industry, we estimate ￿ separately for each industry, again
using non-linear least squares. By looking across industries, we can see if industries di⁄er
signi￿cantly in their respective returns to scale, and whether failure to control for state
di⁄erences in industry mix may bias our returns to scale estimates. In addition, we can see
if the returns to scale at the state level arise from inter-industry externalities (urbanization)
or intra-industry externalities (specialization).
Our estimates do not rule out externalities from specialization and suggest proximity to
the same industry does provide some net economies of scale. For six of the nine industries,
our estimates of ￿ are signi￿cantly greater than 1. In the remaining three industries, namely
agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation and public utilities, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that ￿ = 1. However, the estimates for ￿ are all above 0:92, suggesting that
agglomeration e⁄ects still play an important role, even when we look at productivity within
15These calculations are done using equation (5) ￿ = ￿
￿+￿(1￿￿) and (6) ￿ = ￿=￿:16
industries.16
4.2 Endogeneity
Up to this point, we have assumed that density is exogenous with respect to productivity
in the cross section. We now relax this assumption and re-estimate ￿ using a generalized
method of moments instrumental variables approach. Ciccone and Hall use four di⁄erent
instruments for contemporaneous state employment density: the presence of absence of a
railroad in 1860, state population in 1850, state population density in 1880, and distance
from the eastern sea board. In all cases, they ￿nd b ￿ > 1: All of their instruments seem to
re￿ ect or are highly correlated with lagged employment density. Because of the panel set-up
that we will discuss below, we need to ￿nd an instrument that varies over time. Therefore,
we constructed an explicit measure of lagged density. Our instrument is the weighted average
of county level employment density in a state, using the employment share of each county as
weights, as described earlier.17 This instrument is valid under the assumption that workers
relocate in response to fairly contemporaneous shocks in productivity only, so density from
half a decade or more ago is not in￿ uenced by current labor productivity.
In our cross sectional estimates we use two di⁄erent instruments. In panel 2 of Table 3,
we use employment density in 1977 to instrument for employment density in 1999, and in
panel 3, we use employment density in 1994 as an instrument. The two instruments give
very similar results and once again con￿rm that in the cross section, net increasing returns
to the density is present. Looking at both the aggregate and the within industry estimates,
the pattern is little changed. Across both choices of instrument, ￿ is estimated to be 1:08
and signi￿cantly greater than one for total GSP per worker. To the extent that workers do
16We note that the 0.92 cuto⁄ calculated using 5%-60%-35% factor share decomposition may not be
appropriate for all industries, as they di⁄er in their production factor intensity. Here we merely use it as a
rough benchmark.
17The county density measure we use as an instrument is a linearized version of the county density that
appears as a regressor in the NLS estimations, as discussed in section 2.17
not move in anticipation of potential high productivity in a state 20 years later, it seems our
5 year lagged density may also be a valid instrument as it provides very similar results.
We note that if productivity shocks are extremely persistent (after removing state speci￿c
and business cycle related components), both our instruments as well as Ciccone and Hall￿ s
instruments would induce upward bias in the estimate of net increasing returns.18 Therefore,
we consider an alternative instrumental variables in our panel setup, as will be discussed later.
Turning to industry level data, we now do ￿nd the estimated net returns to scale for
agriculture to be signi￿cantly below 1. However, this is not surprising as agriculture is quite
land intensive. While the estimated ￿￿ s (0:91 using density in 1977 and 0:95 using density in
1994) may imply net decreasing returns relative to the 0:92 benchmark set up above (which
attributed little weight to land as a factor of production), the degree of net returns to scale
is actually quite large relative to a more realistic benchmark for agriculture.19 This seems
to indicate that even in cases where on net the agglomeration e⁄ect does not dominate, it
still plays a signi￿cant role.
With the exception of agriculture, the instrumental variables estimates of ￿ for the other
industries suggest that agglomeration e⁄ects dominate within industry as well. As agri-
culture￿ s share of production is quite small, and the di⁄erences in the estimates for the
other industries are not big, we conclude that failure to control for industrial composition
di⁄erences across state may not cause much bias in the estimations using aggregate data.
18High persistence in state speci￿c productivity shocks (after removing state speci￿c and business cycle
induced components) would suggest that there is a positive correlation between the instruments (lagged
density) and current productivity shocks, which is our regression residual. As density is also positively
autocorrelated, the estimate ￿ would thus be upward biased.
19For example, if we assume labor, capital, and land to occupy equal factor shares in agricultural produc-
tion, any ￿ > 0:38 would imply positive agglomeration externalities.18
4.3 State and Time Fixed E⁄ects: Panel Data
To this point, our identifying assumption in the non-linear least squares estimation has been
that workers choose which counties to live in randomly with respect to the average produc-
tivity of the state. In our instrumental variables estimation, the identifying assumption
is that the choice of location made by workers some number of years past is unrelated to
productivity today. Even this second identifying assumption seems problematic. Time
invariant state ￿xed e⁄ects may drive both the decision to locate in a particular state as
well as productivity in that state. To the extent that positive state amenities may increase
productivity and attract workers simultaneously, failure to address this state ￿xed e⁄ect
would lead to upward bias in the estimate of ￿: Returning to our basic equation (8), we now
allow the productivity term, ln(￿st); to be log-normally distributed around a state speci￿c
component and a time speci￿c component. The error term in our equation can now be














+ ￿s + ￿t + ￿st: (11)
To the extent that density is correlated with the time invariant state speci￿c term, ￿s, the
cross-sectional results are biased. If we assume the entire endogeneity problem in the cross
section is due to a state ￿xed e⁄ect that causes productivity and density to be correlated, then
the panel ￿xed e⁄ect estimation should remove all of the endogeneity, leaving the remaining
variation (arguably) exogenous with respect to density.
We estimate the above equation, where both state and time ￿xed e⁄ects are controlled,
using panel non-linear least squares and present the results in the ￿rst panel of Table 4.
Interestingly, we ￿nd that for total GSP, the point estimate of ￿ is less than 1, which stands
in contrast to the cross sectional results, even though we cannot reject the possibility that
20The log(ct) term is absorbed into the state speci￿c ￿t term.19
￿ = 1. However, the point estimate is large enough so that even if, on net, congestion e⁄ects
dominate, the agglomeration externality is still present. Looking at the industry speci￿c
estimates of ￿, the evidence is a bit more mixed. Construction and manufacturing are the
only two industries that have estimated ￿ that are signi￿cantly greater than 1. Agriculture
has the lowest estimated ￿ at 0:77, which is much more in line with a neoclassical production
function.
While we feel that adding a state-￿xed e⁄ect goes a long way toward attempting to
control for correlation between density and the error term, we also estimate ￿ via generalized
methods of moments by instrumenting for density with 5 year lagged density in the panel
setup. Results from this GMM-IV estimation are given in panel 2 of Table 4. The GMM-IV
estimates of ￿ are more in line with the increasing returns to scale story. For total GSP per
worker, ￿ is estimated at 1:05, only slightly lower than the cross-sectional IV estimate where
we did not control for state speci￿c e⁄ects.
4.4 Agglomeration E⁄ects by Industry
In line with results for total GSP, estimates of ￿ by industry after correcting for endogeneity
are similar to the NLS measures. However, controlling for state and time ￿xed e⁄ects sig-
ni￿cantly e⁄ects the estimates of ￿ for many industries. Two industries stand out with lower
estimates of ￿ relative to other industries in the sample. Agriculture, with an estimate of ￿
less than 1 in all speci￿cations, is land intensive and less likely to bene￿t from spillover e⁄ects
that other industries in more urban areas would. Similarly, the transportation and public
utilities sector, which primarily supply services to other industries are less likely to bene￿t
from knowledge spillovers, input-output externalities and other sources of agglomeration.
In contrast, agglomeration e⁄ects are particularly strong in the manufacturing and con-
struction sectors. The large e⁄ects for manufacturing are consistent other studies (Ellison20
et al., 2010; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009, Wheeler, 2006). These two sectors are most likely
to bene￿t from both positive Marshallian and urbanization externalities. For example, both
sectors bene￿t from labor market pooling, input cost reductions and knowledge spillovers
that have emphasized as important causes of agglomeration in other studies. Moreover,
￿rms in these sectors, particularly manufacturing also bene￿t from economics of scale. Ag-
glomeration e⁄ects are also present in service oriented sectors that include trade, FIRE and
government, although e⁄ects are much smaller. While all estimates suggest the presence of
agglomeration e⁄ects given our parameter assumptions, the e⁄ect of congestion dominates
after adding ￿xed e⁄ects for wholesale trade, services and government.
Using estimates of ￿ from the GMM estimation of (11) in the third panel of Table 3, we
construct the value added weighted average of the industry agglomeration e⁄ect estimates
for 1999. We obtain a weighted average of 1.05, which is less than the estimate of ￿ obtained
using total GSP. Aside from estimation noise, this di⁄erence could re￿ ect the existence of
spillover e⁄ects that are not captured in the industry speci￿c estimates.
4.5 Regional Business Cycles
Another possible confounding factor that we consider is that people move to high produc-
tivity places in response to good technology outcomes or low unemployment rates induced
by the state speci￿c business cycles. If this is the case, then we are identifying the e⁄ect of
density on productivity o⁄ of cyclical variation. Even after controlling for state and time
￿xed e⁄ects, there may be an omitted cycle term included in the error that is correlated with
density. We need to include some measure of the regional business cycle in the regression
equations to control for this.
We choose to control for the regional business cycle with two state-speci￿c aggregate
demand measures. The ￿rst is real state level defense spending, which re￿ ect Department21
of Defense expenditures allocated to respective states. This variable represents cyclical
measure of government expenditure that is exogenous to idiosyncratic productivity shocks
21. The second cyclical control is the so-called ￿Bartik shocks.￿ 22 Bartik shocks are changes
in national employment by industry, weighted by state speci￿c industry weights based on
1980 state level industry output shares. They measure the state level impact of changes in
the composition of labor demand along a stable labor supply curve.23
In terms of our framework above, we now allow our error process to have a cyclical term
that varies by state and time. We include four lags each of the Bartik shocks and of defense
spending. Results are presented in column 2 of Table 5. (For ease of comparison, Column
1 reports the base-line ￿xed e⁄ects model using NLS.) Lags of both Bartik and real defense
spending enter signi￿cantly, and the estimate of returns to scale is further lowered to 0:93.
It is also signi￿cantly less than 1. Compared to the benchmark of ￿ < 0:92 which implies
no agglomeration e⁄ect (￿ = 1), this result suggests that not only do net the neoclassical
congestion e⁄ects seem to dominate, the evidence for the agglomeration e⁄ect is also much
weaker than our initial estimation. However, in column 4 we instrument for density with
lagged density, and our estimate of ￿ rises back up to 1.07.
It is interesting to note that when we do not use instruments and rely on state and time
￿xed e⁄ects and cyclical controls alone, estimates of ￿ are either not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from 1 or are actually below 1 (see Table 5 columns 1 and 2). They are in general lower
than the ￿ estimated via generalized method of moments with instrumental variables (see
column 3 and 4). Similar to our discussion in section 4.2, if the non-cyclical part of state
speci￿c productivity shocks are quite persistent (after removing the state and time speci￿c
components), then using lagged density as an instrument would likely bias upward our ￿
21Barro (1981) ￿nd that both permanent and transitory defense purchases have a signi￿cant expansionary
e⁄ect on real GNP.
22See ￿Who Bene￿ts from State and Local Economic Development Policies?￿by Timothy J. Bartik (1991)
23Other studies employing Bartik shocks include Glaeser et al. (2006) and Saks (2008).22
estimates.
Therefore, as a ￿nal robustness check, we consider an alternative instrument set for
current density: birthrates lagged 20 and 25 years. To the extent that birthrates across
states are exogenous to current productivity, high birthrates in a state 20 some years ago
should lead to more exogenous labor entry now, hence higher employment density. Using
lagged birthrates as instruments, we estimate the base-line panel speci￿cation and the panel
speci￿cation with cyclical controls. Column 5 shows that without cyclical controls, ￿ is
estimated at 0:61: However, once the cyclical controls are included, b ￿ rises back up to 1:07.
While the 0:61 number may suggest net decreasing returns, we note that in reality, lagged
birthrates may be negatively correlated with current productivity, as poorer regions tend to
have higher birthrates and state income position may be persistent. Therefore, using lagged
birthrates as instruments may cause downward bias in our estimates.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to re-examine the results of Ciccone and Hall (1996), which ￿nds
evidence of net increasing returns to the density of economic activity by comparing a cross-
section of US states. We argue that there are a number of factors that Ciccone and Hall
neglected to consider that may be important in estimating the returns to density. Speci￿-
cally, the empirical challenge we take up here is to isolate, as much as possible, the e⁄ect of
exogenous density movements on output per worker. Identi￿cation is indeed a thorny issue
in this context. To the extent that workers move in response to productivity, a state-speci￿c,
time-varying instrument that is correlated with density but unrelated to productivity oth-
erwise, is what is required. Given that such instruments are almost impossible to ￿nd,
we address the endogeneity problem by making speci￿c assumptions about the source and
nature of the error term (productivity shock), and try to use the functional form of our23
estimation equations to correctly estimate the returns to employment density under these
assumptions.
A second goal of this paper is to examine di⁄erences in returns to scale by industry.
Looking at a cross-section of US states in 1999, we ￿nd that estimates are consistent with an
increasing-returns-to-scale story across most one-digit SIC industries or, at the very least,
give evidence in favor of a large role for agglomeration e⁄ects. These evidence is weakest for
the agriculture and transportation sectors, which are less likely to bene￿t from Marshallian
externalities that other sectors would. We also ￿nd evidence that agglomeration e⁄ects
spillover across industries.
To better control for state speci￿c amenities, we extend the analysis to a panel data
framework and control for both state- and time-￿xed e⁄ects. And ￿nally, we include mea-
sures of aggregate demand to control for business cycle e⁄ects. In addition to the inclusion
of state, time and cyclical controls, we instrument for density with both lagged density and
lagged birthrates.
In our panel framework, controlling for time- and state-￿xed e⁄ects, we estimate ￿ to be
0:99 for total GSP, and when we include cyclical controls, our estimate falls to 0:93. From
these two point estimates, we are tempted to conclude that on net, there are no increasing
returns to scale even though agglomeration e⁄ects may still play some role. However, when
we instrument for density using either lagged density or lagged birthrates, our estimates of
￿ climb to values signi￿cantly greater than 1.
We estimate net returns to scale as the net e⁄ect of agglomeration and congestion. Our
results suggest that even in a richer empirical framework, there is still strong evidence in
favor of the importance of agglomeration e⁄ects. The evidence regarding the presence of net
increasing returns to density is more mixed, and we conjecture that an alternative modeling
framework may be necessary to produce more conclusive results.24
Table 1: Cross State Averages by Industry for 1982 and 19991
1982 1999
Productivity Edu. Density Productivity Edu. Density
Total 40:87 12:97 192:39 51:08 13:61 207:34
(5:86) (0:44) (623:67) (8:21) (:31) (628)
Agriculture 20:75 11:12 0:75 28:23 12:04 0:46
(6:53) (1:39) (1:82) (8:30) (1:37) (0:55)
Construction 35:37 11:76 4:15 37:47 12:39 4:85
(8:42) (0:72) (7:00) (7:20) (0:43) (6:60)
Manufacturing 42:38 12:19 19:02 78:38 13:01 11:89
(10:39) (0:61) (43:98) (27:64) (0:49) (21:72)
Transportation 65:47 12:52 13:12 91:30 13:27 10:25
(7:91) (0:41) (40:28) (15:53) (0:29) (21:17)
Wholesale Trade 44:92 12:92 14:03 88:89 13:24 9:37
(4:83) (0:41) (53:26) (13:53) (0:30) (26:71)
Retail Trade 20:51 12:34 17:63 29:49 12:83 19:46
(2:27) (0:35) (36:26) (3:95) (0:28) (38:48)
FIRE 109:14 13:60 37:27 115:12 14:05 37:94
(14:55) (0:31) (182:08) (35:07) (0:36) (175:41)
Services 32:53 14:09 62:48 31:22 14:42 88:67
(4:67) (0:42) (213:41) (6:62) (0:31) (277:68)
Government 42:75 13:42 42:16 43:78 14:27 41:54
(6:50) (0:37) (143:06) (7:22) (0:35) (143:46)
1Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Current Population Survey and authors￿calcula-
tions. Productivity, measured as GSP per worker, is in 1000s of 1996 dollars. Education is the average
years of schooling weighted by hours worked. Density in this table is a linearized version of the density
measure used as a regressor and is the county level employment weighted share of workers per acre (see text
for further details). Standard deviations are in parenthesis.25
Table 2: Cross State Average Output and Employment Shares by Industry for
1982 and 19991
1982 1999
Output Share Empl. Share Output Share Empl. Share
Agriculture 2:39 4:02 1:35 3:18
(3:43) (3:25) (1:36) (2:04)
Construction 4:06 4:67 4:47 5:65
(1:12) (1:27) (1:18) (1:08)
Manufacturing 20:22 16:82 16:12 11:76
(8:73) (6:63) (6:66) (4:36)
Transportation 9:18 4:93 8:38 4:87
(1:83) (0:86) (2:28) (0:85)
Wholesale Trade 6:96 5:00 6:91 4:56
(1:55) (0:96) (1:52) (0:85)
Retail Trade 8:95 15:86 9:19 16:43
(1:44) (1:59) (1:52) (1:77)
FIRE 15:56 7:75 19:25 7:92
(3:06) (1:38) (5:79) (1:62)
Services 14:75 23:43 21:34 31:55
(4:30) (4:10) (4:30) (4:23)
Government 13:21 16:19 11:77 13:59
(5:6) (4:92) (4:50) (3:87)
1Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Current Population Survey, and authors￿calcula-
tions. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.26
Table 3: Labor Productivity and Density by Industry, 1999



















+ ￿ lnedus + "s
NLS IV=Density in 1977 IV = Density in 1994
Edu Density Edu Density Edu Density
Total GSP 0:19 1:08￿￿ 0:30 1:08￿￿ 0:27 1:08￿￿
(0:75) (0:01) (0:73) (0:02) (0:74) (0:02)
Agriculture ￿0:12 0:95 ￿0:17 0:91￿ ￿0:14 0:93￿
(0:37) (0:05) (0:21) (0:05) (0:22) (0:04)
Construction 1:73￿￿ 1:10￿￿ 1:68￿￿ 1:09￿￿ 1:69￿￿ 1:09￿￿
(0:6) (0:02) (0:48) (0:02) (0:47) (0:02)
Manufacturing 2:50￿￿ 0:99 2:33￿￿ 1:01 2:30￿￿ 1:01
(0:99) (0:03) (1:10) (0:03) (1:07) (0:03)
TPU 1:05 1:02 1:05 1:03 1:20 1:02
(1:06) (0:02) (0:97) (0:02) (0:98) (0:03)
Wholesale Trade 0:49 1:07￿￿ 0:46 1:07￿￿ 0:59 1:06￿￿
(0:71) (0:01) (0:56) (0:02) (0:62) (0:02)
Retail Trade ￿1:47￿￿ 1:07￿￿ ￿1:53￿￿ 1:07￿￿ ￿1:51￿￿ 1:07￿￿
(0:66) (0:01) (0:74) (0:01) (0:75) (0:01)
FIRE 2:30￿ 1:11￿￿ 2:74￿￿ 1:10￿￿ 2:66￿￿ 1:10￿￿
(1:29) (0:02) (1:17) (0:02) (1:17) (0:02)
Services ￿1:39￿ 1:12￿￿ ￿1:29 1:11￿￿ ￿1:32 1:11￿￿
(0:74) (0:01) (0:94) (0:01) (0:94) (0:01)
Government 1:53￿￿ 1:07￿￿ 1:69￿￿ 1:07￿￿ 1:64￿￿ 1:07￿￿
(0:52) (0:01) (0:61) (0:01) (0:59) (0:01)
1The instrumental variable used is the lagged employment share weighted average workers per acre at the
county level for each state in respective years. Heteroskedasticity-consistent White standard errors appear
in parenthesis. A * (**) indicates signi￿cance at the 10% (5%) level. Inference regarding ￿, the coe¢ cient
on the non-linear density term, is relative to the null value of 1.27
Table 4: Labor Productivity and Density by Industry, 1982-1999


















+ ￿ lnedust + ￿s + ￿t + ￿st
NLS IV=Lagged Density
Edu Density Edu Density
Total GSP 0:59￿￿ 0:99 0:68￿￿ 1:05￿￿
(0:13) (0:02) (0:16) (0:02)
Agriculture ￿0:04 0:77￿￿ ￿0:12 0:14￿￿
(0:11) (0:08) (0:11) (0:13)
Construction 0:63￿￿ 1:25￿￿ 0:92￿￿ 1:56￿￿
(0:11) (0:02) (0:17) (0:11)
Manufacturing 0:67￿￿ 1:08￿￿ 0:74 1:20￿￿
(0:29) (0:03) (0:47) (0:04)
TPU 0:21 0:84￿￿ 0:20 0:78￿￿
(0:15) (0:03) (0:15) (0:04)
Wholesale Trade 0:13￿￿ 0:95￿￿ 0:13 0:97
(0:06) (0:01) (0:08) (0:02)
Retail Trade ￿0:16 0:97 ￿0:16 1:04￿
(0:10) (0:02) (0:11) (0:02)
Fire 0:98￿￿ 0:91￿￿ 1:01￿￿ 1:04
(0:17) (0:03) (0:18) (0:05)
Services 0:30￿￿ 0:94￿￿ 0:3￿￿ 0:96￿
(0:14) (0:02) (0:15) (0:03)
Government 0:20￿￿ 0:96￿￿ 0:19￿￿ 0:93￿￿
(0:06) (0:02) (0:06) (0:03)
1The instrumental variable used is the employment share weighted average workers per acre at the county
level for each state lagged ￿ve years. Autoregressive and heteroskedasticity-consistent Newey-West standard
errors appear in parenthesis. A * (**) indicates signi￿cance at the 10% (5%) level. Inference regarding ￿,
the coe¢ cient on the non-linear density term, is relative to the null value of 1.28
Table 5: Labor Productivity and Density, Total GSP 1982-1999
Non-Linear Least Squares Estimation and GMM Instrumental Variables Estimation with


















+ ￿ lnedust + ￿s + ￿t + ￿st
NLS IV=Lagged Density IV=Birthrate
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education 0:59￿￿ 0:52￿￿ 0:68￿￿ 0:75￿￿ 0:01 1:07￿￿
(0:13) (0:13) (0:16) (0:17) (0:30) (0:02)
Density 0:99 0:93￿￿ 1:05￿￿ 1:07￿￿ 0:61￿￿ 1:08￿￿
(0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:13) (0:02)
Wald3 Wald Wald
Lags of Bartik 76:00 28:05 28:06
(< 0:01) (< 0:01) (< 0:01)
Lags of Defense 9:67 28:43 28:43
(0:08) (< 0:01) (< 0:01)
R2 0:94 0:94 0:94 0:93 0:90 0:93
N. Obs 900 864 900 864 897 864
1Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent Newey-West standard errors appear in parenthesis.
A * (**) indicates signi￿cance at the 10% ( 5%) level. Inference regarding ￿, the coe¢ cient on the non-linear
density term, is relative to the null value of 1.
2The Wald test is of the null that the coe¢ cients are jointly zero. P-values are in parenthesis.
3The Wald test is of the null that the coe¢ cients are jointly zero. P-values are in parenthesis.29
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